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Beyond the Bad Apple—Transforming the 
American Workplace for Women after #MeToo 
Claudia Flores† 
INTRODUCTION 
This recent era of the #MeToo Movement has caused many to ques-
tion whether U.S. sexual harassment laws and policies are responsive 
to workplace realities. Complaint-based employer policies, contractu-
ally-mandated arbitration agreements, time-limited administrative ex-
haustion requirements, and narrow judicial interpretations of actiona-
ble conduct have created a myriad of barriers to workers seeking 
enforcement. For women (and some men) targeted by harassing behav-
ior it has often been too costly—financially, professionally, and person-
ally—to navigate a system that depends almost exclusively on individ-
ual complainants to prompt social reform. 
U.S. law has largely relied on the “bad apple” theory of harass-
ment.1 The harasser is a wayward employee and the employer an inno-
cent third party to interpersonal relations and relation(ships) that have 
gone awry. Though courts have found Title VII to provide a legal rem-
edy for sexual harassment, they have struggled to define this form of 
gender discrimination, instead developing complex tests that rely on 
prevailing opinions of gendered interactions, sometimes reproducing 
the very sexism Title VII sought to correct. 
Meanwhile, numerous studies have found that sexual harassment 
is best understood not as isolated occurrences between individuals but 
as patterns of behavior that are prominent in certain workplaces and 
correlated with workplace features within an employer’s control. More-
over, research indicates that sexual harassment is both impacted by the 
work environment and alters that environment by reducing employee 
 
 †  Claudia Flores is an associate clinical professor of law and director of the International 
Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School. Previously, Professor Flores was a 
staff attorney at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project and partner at Hughes Socol Pierce Resnik 
and Dym where she litigated sexual harassment and other workplace gender discrimination cases. 
 1 See Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 817 (2004). 
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satisfaction, productivity and efficacy, and, unsurprisingly, discourag-
ing women from entering and staying, as well as hampering their rise 
to positions of influence. 
Congress sought to transform the American workplace with Title 
VII, but the implementation of the statute has failed to do so. In this 
Article, I will explore how we might move past the “bad apple” theory 
of sexual harassment to better change the workplace for women. I will 
argue that our current legal framework cannot provide the necessary 
shift in workplace practices. Instead, we need a transformation of both 
our understanding of sexual harassment and our approach to eradicat-
ing it. We need to focus less on sex and more on harassment and less on 
liability and more on prevention to move towards gender equality in 
employment. 
In Part One, I will begin by summarizing U.S. law on sexual har-
assment and the legal standard that has emerged. I will discuss how 
our aversion to regulating workplace behavior, narrow judicial inter-
pretations, and reliance on existing social norms has led to an impover-
ished enforcement system. In Part Two, I will explore Title VII’s trans-
formative purpose in the context of what research and scholarly work 
have concluded about the nature, purpose, and impact of harassment. 
In Part Three, I will review international standards and comparative 
jurisdictions that have taken an alternative approach to sexual harass-
ment that positions it as one form of workplace abuse, among others. I 
will discuss how this alternative approach, which is grounded in the 
dual concepts of human dignity and equality, has allowed for greater 
emphasis on prevention of the conditions that enable sexual harass-
ment. In Part Four, I will explore the possibility and advantages of en-
gaging with this approach in the U.S. context, and our need to develop 
a standard of workplace behavior against which to measure the inequal-
ity harassment engenders. Finally, in Part Five, I will discuss the im-
portance and possibility of developing a positive vision of the workplace, 
grounded in women’s dignity and equality, in order to build an Ameri-
can workplace that fulfills the original vision of Title VII. 
I. U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits em-
ployment discrimination in hiring, firing, and compensation, and terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.2 Congress intended Title VII to transform 
the American workplace by “improv[ing] the economic and social condi-
tions of minorities and women by providing equality of opportunity in 
 
 2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). 
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the work place,” recognizing that “[t]hese conditions were part of a 
larger pattern of restriction, exclusion, discrimination, segregation, and 
inferior treatment of minorities and women in many areas of life.”3 Con-
gress also understood that the liability mechanism created in Title VII 
could only be a component of a broader effort to move towards equality 
in the workplace, and “strongly encouraged employers, labor organiza-
tions, and other persons subject to title VII . . . to act on a voluntary 
basis to modify employment practices and systems which constituted 
barriers to equal employment opportunity, without awaiting litigation 
or formal government action.”4 
In the mid-80s, courts began to recognize workplace sexual harass-
ment as a form of gender discrimination under Title VII.5 As courts de-
veloped jurisprudence around harassment claims, they acknowledged 
Title VII’s reformative aim: “[t]he purpose of Title VII is not to import 
into the workplace the prejudices of the community, but through law to 
liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, 
and thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic 
equality in employment.”6 Yet, courts often struggled to implement 
these goals in a manner that captured the social transformation Title 
VII envisioned,7 instead often relying on the very societal prejudices Ti-
tle VII sought to eradicate.8 Consequently, over time, Title VII’s goal of 
redefining the workplace against cultural norms of inequality was lost. 
 
 3 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (1979). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986); Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and 
Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1227, 1267 (1994) (“The victim of sexual harassment is a vulnera-
ble player within the courts. Sexual harassment protections in America are almost completely the 
product of the judiciary; as a statute, Title VII gives virtually no guidance about this type of sex 
discrimination.”). 
 6 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64; Los Angeles 
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)) (“The language of Title VII is not limited to 
‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination. The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ 
evinces a congressional intent’ ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women’ in employment’”); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Henson 
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)) (“By acknowledging and not trivializing the 
effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that neither 
men nor women will have to “run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being 
allowed to work and make a living.”“) 
 7 Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881 (quoting Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 
1990)) (“Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To the contrary, 
“Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of degradation 
which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women.”) 
 8 See e.g., Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1017, 1018 (8th Cir. 1988): (“Title VII does 
not mandate an employment environment worthy of a Victorian salon. Nor do we expect that our 
holding today will displace all ribaldry on the roadway. One may well expect that in the heat and 
dust of the construction site language of the barracks will always predominate over that of the 
ballroom. What occurred in this case, however, went well beyond the bounds of what any person 
should have to tolerate.”); See Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 338, 342 (“Today, while gender relations in 
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Courts have more or less divided sexual harassment claims into 
two categories—quid pro quo harassment and harassment that creates 
a “hostile work environment.”9 Quid pro quo means “something for 
something” and involves claims where submission to or rejection of un-
welcome sexual conduct results in a tangible employment action that 
adversely impacts the complainant. The classic example is when a su-
pervisor offers a promotion in exchange for sex. Courts have found these 
sorts of claims to be straightforward—achieving consensus on the fact 
that women (and men) should not be required to provide sexual favors 
or attention in exchange for workplace benefits or concessions.10 
Hostile work environment claims have proven to be the more diffi-
cult category. These claims involve harassment that result in no clear 
adverse employment action other than the impact of the harassment on 
the employee and her or his work experience. In order to make out a 
claim for a hostile work environment, a complainant must prove that 
the conduct was severe or pervasive.11 The “employment action” in a 
hostile work environment case must come in the form of some alteration 
of the workplace. The employee must demonstrate that (1) the employee 
was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment was based 
on sex, (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to 
alter the terms or conditions of employment and create an abusive 
working environment (judged by both an objective and subjective stand-
ard), and (4) that the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment.12 This analysis requires a mixed inquiry of law and fact by 
judges and juries.13 
 
the workplace are rapidly evolving, and views of what is appropriate behavior are diverse and 
shifting, a jury made up of a cross-section of our heterogeneous communities provides the appro-
priate institution for deciding whether borderline situations should be characterized as sexual 
harassment and retaliation.”). For an explanation for why juries are not well situated to make 
sexual harassment determinations and often reflect community prejudices in their assessments of 
workplace hostility see Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harass-
ment, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 813 (1998). 
 9 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. 
 10 See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); see also EEOC, Policy Guidance on Employer Liability Under 
Title VII for Sexual Favoritism, No. 915.048 (Jan. 12, 1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexu 
alfavor.html [https://perma.cc/R8QU-Z5P7]. 
 11 See generally, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133 (2004) (to be actionable under 
Title VII, plaintiffs must show “harassing behavior ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of [their] employment’”) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). 
 12 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 891, 903–05 (11th Cir. 1982) (identifying elements 
of a sexual harassment claim). 
 13 See Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 8, at 815 (discussing allocation of sexual harassment 
determinations between judges and juries). 
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The first step is determining whether the harassment occurred be-
cause of the plaintiffs’ sex.14 The harassing conduct need not be moti-
vated by sexual desire but only general hostility to the presence of a 
certain sex in the workplace.15 While this standard appears to address 
a broad category of gender-motivated harassment, courts have repeat-
edly rejected claims in which general hostility to women is evident but 
not made explicit in sexualized comments.16 Claims based on behavior 
that side-lines, humiliates, excludes, demeans, or otherwise treats 
women in a hostile manner in the workplace are not necessarily consid-
ered by courts to be “because of sex.”17 
The second requirement—that the harassment is sufficiently se-
vere and pervasive—is a threshold-setting standard for the behavior in 
question. Courts have looked at the “frequency of the discriminatory 
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliat-
ing, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably inter-
feres with an employee’s work performance.”18 The Supreme Court has 
differentiated between the workplace (1) that is “permeated with ‘dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’” and (2) where there is 
the “‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in an employee.’”19 In general, relatively isolated instances of non-
severe misconduct will not support a hostile work environment claim.20 
“A recurring point in [our] opinions,” the Court stated in Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton,21 “is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and 
 
 14 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“Title VII does not pro-
hibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat[ion] . . . 
because of . . . sex.’”). 
 15 Id. (“[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex.”). 
 16 See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 572 (6th Cir. 1999) (Ryan, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority’s artificial construct-that non-sexual harassment of a female in the workplace 
can give rise to Title VII sex discrimination liability if it evinces ‘anti-female animus’ is a radical 
rewriting of settled Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence.”); see also Faragher vs. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“Title VII does not prohibit ‘genuine but innocuous differences in 
the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite 
sex.’ A recurring point in [our] opinions is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated 
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and 
conditions of employment. These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to en-
sure the Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code.’”). 
 17 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 22 
(2018). 
 18 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).   
 19 Id. at 21. 
 20 The Supreme Court has distinguished between a workplace that is “permeated with ‘dis-
criminatory’ intimidation, ridicule, and insult” and one where there is the “mere utterance” of an 
offense. Harris, 510 U.S. 17 at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67); see also Young v. Phila. 
Police Dep’t, 94 F. Supp. 3d 683, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d 651 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 21 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
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isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discrim-
inatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”22 
The third element of the claim is whether the behavior created an 
abusive work environment, an assessment involving an objective and 
subjective determination. In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,23 the Supreme 
Court rejected the approach taken by three circuits which had required 
a “serious effect” since “concrete psychological harm [is] an element Ti-
tle VII does not require.”24 Instead, the Harris Court adopted a require-
ment that the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was 
both objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive. To meet the objec-
tive standard, conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment.25 To meet the subjec-
tive standard, the plaintiff needs to prove that she or he perceived the 
environment to be abusive.26 
Both the subjective and objective determination of what constitutes 
an abusive work environment have significantly limited the anti-dis-
criminatory impact of Title VII, circumscribing the universe of abusive 
treatment that the statute deters. The objective standard, which re-
quires courts to determine how a reasonable person would receive the 
harassment, has, unsurprisingly, led to complexities around the van-
tage point of the “reasonable person.” Some courts experimented with 
adding specific attributes to the reasonable person, asking whether a 
reasonable African American woman would find the harassment offen-
sive, or whether a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would find 
the behavior offensive.27 To resolve this, in 1998, the Supreme Court 
attempted to offer some clarification in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc.,28 questioning whether “the objective severity of harass-
ment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in 
 
 22 Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75, 81 (1998)). 
 23 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 24 Id. at 22. 
 25 Id. (“So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile 
or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.”). 
 26 Id. at 21–22 (“If the victim does not subjectively perceive the environmental to be abusive, 
the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no 
Title VII violation.” However, “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a 
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seri-
ously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing their 
careers.”). 
 27 Compare Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F. 3d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding reasonable 
person jury instruction as opposed to “reasonable African American or women” jury instruction) 
with West v. Phila. Elec. Co. 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (where the objective standard was 
reviewed as “reasonable person of the same protected class in that position.”). 
 28 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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the plaintiff’s position.”29 The Supreme Court set forth an analysis 
based upon the objective reasonable person standard that looked at “the 
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by 
its target” which inevitably “depends on a constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully cap-
tured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts per-
formed.”30 While this standard attempted to provide more nuance, it 
also yielded more discretion to draw upon problematic societal norms.31 
The subjective test, which essentially asks whether the conduct 
was unwelcome, is a complicity test of whether or not the plaintiff wel-
comed the behavior.32 Conduct is unwelcome if the plaintiff did not so-
licit or incite it and if the plaintiff regarded the conduct as undesirable 
or offensive.33 Courts have held that certain conduct, particularly rape, 
is unwelcome by definition.34 However, determinations of whether con-
duct was welcome have sent courts down the rabbit hole of assessing a 
plaintiff’s behavior to determine if the alleged harassment was a com-
ponent of acceptable gendered interactions or not.35 
The final question is whether employer liability is triggered or 
whether the employer knew or should have known the harassment oc-
curred. For claims related to a supervisor, the employer is vicariously 
liable but may utilize an affirmative defense. The employer may avoid 
liability by demonstrating that (1) the employer exercised reasonable 
 
 29 Id. at 81–82. 
 30 Id.; see also E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 460 (5th Cir. 2013), (citing 
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 (1998) (“We view the alleged harassment with ‘[c]ommon sense, and 
an appropriate sensitivity to social context’ to determine whether it constitutes ‘conduct which a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile.’”). 
 31 For example, there is some indication in psychological research that juries are resistant or 
unable to apply reasonable person standards from particular perspectives in discrimination cases. 
Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination 
Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1332–33 (2011). 
 32 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (for conduct to constitute sexual 
harassment, it must be unwelcome to the victim). 
 33 See Frensley v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 440 F. App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2011); Burnes v. 
McGregor Electr. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1993); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 34 See, e.g., Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It goes without saying that 
forcible rape is ‘unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature.’”) (citing Little v. Windermere 
Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 35 Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (Similarly, a plaintiff’s partici-
pation in foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting outside the workplace “does not 
waive her legal protections against unwelcome harassment.”); E.E.O.C. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
Nos. 97-02229, 97-02252, 1999 WL 1032963 (10th Cir. 1999) (Evidence that a plaintiff had consen-
sual sexual relationships with other co-workers outside of work “is not relevant to [plaintiff]’s 
claims of harassment at work.”); see also Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(evidence of female employee’s sexual behavior and comments in the workplace was “highly pro-
bative of issue of whether the alleged harassment was unwelcomed.”); Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 
F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1999) (evidence of alleged sexual relations between employee and ex-hus-
band outside the workplace during period when harassment occurred should be excluded). 
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care to prevent and correct sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of this protection.36 The 
employer is liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees or non-
employees over whom it has control, if it knew or should have known 
about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate cor-
rective action.37 An employer is merely required to be responsive—hav-
ing an available anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure 
which the employee unreasonably failed to use would defeat the claim.38 
Overall, this complex test has created barriers to claimants39 and 
failed to provide effective guidance to employers and employees.40 The 
core legal concepts the test relies on—“severe and pervasive”, “unwel-
come” and “offensive”—remain vague and have often resulted in incon-
sistent and narrow assessments of sexual harassment claims.41 Schol-
ars have proposed various reforms that seek to alter the allocation of 
fact-finding determinations between judges and juries in hopes of better 
capturing the reformative aims of Title VII. Some have proposed that 
the judiciary should exercise greater influence in factual determina-
tions as it has done in other contexts in which uniformity and predicta-
bility are paramount.42 Excessive reliance on juries to assess the sever-
ity and offensive nature of harassment, scholars have argued, yields 
inconsistent decisions without precedential value, often reflecting the 
predominating prejudices Title VII seeks to transform.43 In contrast, 
some researchers have found that judges consistently downplay and 
minimize instances of harassment to the detriment of litigants.44 The 
current composition of the judiciary, it is argued, is far too disconnected 
 
 36 See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Faragher vs. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 
 37 EEOC, Harassment; Employer Liability for Harassment, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/ 
harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/A9RD-84AY]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Sean Captain, Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at Trial, FAST COMP-  
ANY, (July 31, 2017), http://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-rights-
lawsuits [https://perma.cc/4J5A-U5VZ] (finding that, of the cases filed in court that are not settled 
or voluntarily dismissed, less than 1 percent result in a favorable outcome); Eyer, supra note 31 at 
1299 (exploring the reasons for the low success rates of discrimination lawsuits). 
 40 See generally SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS 
UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (Oxford University Press, 2017); Scheindlin & Elofson, supra 
note 8; U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE, 115TH CONG., So I 
Tolerated It—How Work Places Are Responding to Harassment and the Clear Need for Federal Act- 
ion: Minority Staff Report (December 2018) [henceforth Minority Staff Report] [https://www.help.s 
enate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senator%20Murray%20Harassment%20Report%20Final.pdf]. 
 41 Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 8; U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND 
PENSIONS COMMITTEE, Minority Staff Report, supra note 40 at 31–33. 
 42 Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 8 at 834–37. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap between What Judges and Reasonable 
People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 809–17 (May 2002). 
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from the realities of the workplace to effectively assess harassment 
claims.45 
Both perspectives reflect a similar concern that the legal frame-
work developed by the courts impedes the policy goals of Title VII. With-
out a path towards the social reform Title VII seeks, sexual harassment 
determinations in our courts are bound to be vague and regressive.46 As 
one commentator noted, “[s]ociety can hardly be expected to reform it-
self without notice as to what title VII requires.”47 That this problematic 
adjudicative process is placed within an administrative process that 
most agree also limits the reform aims of Title VII is even more con-
cerning. In hostile work environment claims, employees must first file 
with their employer’s internal complaint process. Then they must file 
their claims through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
(EEOC) administrative process and must do so within 180 to 300 days 
of the offense.48 Due to limited resources, the EEOC only pursues a 
small portion of reported claims, often issuing right to sue letters for 
complainants to pursue private litigation, a costly undertaking which 
is prohibitive to many.49 Thus, the cases that make it to court already 
represent a small portion of the claims filed with the EEOC.50 
The result of these administrative process hurdles and our legal 
determination of harassment is that few instances of gender-motivated 
abusive workplace behavior are held to account under Title VII.51 Ulti-
mately, the costs of litigation, both financial and otherwise, are rarely 
worth it to the aggrieved party. Loss of career status, pursuit of claims 
 
 45 33.3 percent of Supreme Court justices are women, 36.8 percent of Circuit Court of Appeals 
judges are women, and 34 percent of Federal District Court judges are women. AM. BAR ASS’N, A 
Current Glance at Women in the Law, at 5 (Jan. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/women/a-current-glance-at-women-in-the-law-jan-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2KHX-XPAC]. 
 46 Researchers have concluded that features of American culture create reluctance by any fact-
finder (judge or jury) to attribute workplace wrongs to status discrimination. Eyer, supra note 31, 
at 1299. 
 47 Scheindlin and Elofson, supra note 8, at 834. 
 48 EEOC, Time Limits for Filing a Charge, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm [ht  
tps://perma.cc/CHE6-6D7Q]. 
 49 EEOC, What You Can Expect After You File A Charge, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/pro-
cess.cfm [https://perma.cc/LWA9-N225]. 
 50 EEOC, All Charges Alleging Harassment (Charges Filed with the EEOC) FY 2010-FY2018, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/N535-9W 
WF]. 
 51 U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE, Minority Staff Re-
port, supra note 40, at 10–15 (discussing EEOC charge data and lack of reliable data on sexual 
harassment charge success). 
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resulting in job losses, personal investments, cost of legal representa-
tion, and the emotional drain of the process all make harassment claims 
a burdensome pursuit.52 
II. RECONSIDERING THE U.S. APPROACH 
Half a century later, Title VII’s original transformative goals ap-
pear to have been, at best, curtailed and, at worst, rendered ineffectual, 
by a complaint-dependent, liability-focused process, saddled with un-
der-resourced administrative hurdles and courts that have narrowed 
the statute’s potential. Our unwillingness to address the misogyny and 
sexism that underpins harassment—maintaining instead a focus on its 
individual and inter-personal nature—has undermined Title VII’s im-
pact on women in employment, undercutting its original aim to “liber-
ate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and 
thereby to implement the goals of human dignity and economic equality 
in employment.”53 The question is now whether we can reorient our ap-
proach to sexual harassment and fulfill Title VII’s transformative in-
tention. 
A return to the goals of Title VII and the intention of Congress to 
“liberate the workplace” from gender inequality requires a more for-
ward-looking approach than the one we have employed thus far. Like 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which sought to end segregation in schools, 
Title VII sought to fundamentally alter the workplace, a task its imple-
mentation has not achieved.54 A transformative approach to discrimi-
nation is one that understands that inequalities are rooted in history, 
and that divisions are not arbitrary or irrational but often deliberately 
preserve current structures.55 This approach requires an inquiry into 
the values, behaviors, institutions, and power relations that maintain 
women’s inequality through sexual harassment.56 
By this measure, determinations ungrounded in policy goals or re-
liance on dominant cultural norms and public opinion is misguided. A 
legal assessment of sexual harassment that seeks transformation would 
not aim to reflect social norms but instead would pursue an assessment 
 
 52 Christine O. Merriman and Cora G. Yang, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harass-
ment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83, 84 note 6 (1985) (citing an unpublished 
1979 Working Women’s Institute Study (WWI)). 
 53 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 54 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 55 The Constitutional Court in South Africa provides a good example of a transformative ap-
proach to discrimination claims. See Catherine Albertyn, Substantive Equality and Transfor-
mation in South Africa, 23 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 253 (2007). 
 56 Id. 
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of harassment that advances women’s workplace equality and recog-
nizes the barriers to that equality. In other words, our laws on sexual 
harassment and their implementation should move us forward rather 
than merely reflect our discriminatory surroundings. 
A. Sexual Harassment and the Structure of the Workplace 
As discussed, our legal conception of sexual harassment focuses pri-
marily on ensuring those with authority in the workplace do not use it 
to elicit sexual services, favors, and interactions, and that extreme sex-
ually degrading and/or intrusive behavior is punished.57 While these 
are important features of sexual harassment, they do not address the 
broader context and elements of the American workplace that make 
harassment possible and advantageous. By focusing on the bad ac-
tors/rotten apples that abuse their authority or openly degrade their 
female coworkers, our legal approach to sexual harassment misses and 
renders acceptable many other forms of sexual harassment that impede 
women from attaining their full economic potential through employ-
ment. 
The last decade of research has painted an increasingly clear pic-
ture of sexual harassment—its nature, benefit and impact—which dif-
fers from the one reflected in our jurisprudence. Research indicates that 
sexual harassment is often not an isolated event nor one disconnected 
from other features of a workplace, but a tactic that defines certain 
workplaces and is a critical component of them. Sexual harassment is 
not merely the experience of a few unlucky women but a practice that 
advances, entrenches, and preserves workplace inequalities, discourag-
ing women from pursuing higher-level positions or even entering cer-
tain industries. This more complex understanding of harassment puts 
into question the judicial approach of requiring “a showing of tremen-
dous harm done to a flawless plaintiff.”58 
Studies have identified various predictors of harassment, including 
particular workplace practices and industries prone to high levels of 
harassment. Male-dominated workplaces (e.g., construction),59 low-
wage workplaces populated by women (e.g., retail and care providers),60 
 
 57 Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination 
Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/open-
statement-on-sexual-harassment-from-employment-discrimination-law-scholars/ [https://perma.c 
c/6CAK-UW65]. 
 58 See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 1271. 
 59 Kim Parker, Women in Majority-Male Workplaces Report Higher Rates of Gender Discrimi- 
nation, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 7, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07/ 
women-in-majority-male-workplaces-report-higher-rates-of-gender-discrimination/ [https://perma 
.cc/47DZ-6TMJ]. 
 60 Jocelyn Frye, Not Just the Rich and Famous: The Pervasiveness of Sexual Harassment 
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and industries where workers are excluded from labor law protections 
(e.g., domestic work and farm labor)61 are all associated with higher lev-
els of sexual harassment. Poorly structured work environments (e.g., 
laborer working in isolation, poor management structures, excessive su-
pervisory discretion, lack of clear rule making and enforcement) and 
workplaces with inadequate complaint systems also evidence higher 
levels of harassment.62 
Male-dominated workplaces have consistently been found to have 
higher rates of harassment of female workers than gender-balanced 
workplaces.63 For example, a study relying on charge data from the 
EEOC found that, in a male majority industry like construction (91% 
male workers), women were 27 times more likely than men to report 
sexual harassment. In comparison, in health care and social assistance 
industries, where 21% of workers are male, women were only 1.2 times 
more likely to report sexual harassment than men.64 In male-majority 
industries, female supervisors are also more likely to experience har-
assing behaviors than in predominately female industries.65 
Women in female-dominated workplaces where women are in low-
wage positions with high levels of turnover, such as retail and elder or 
child care, also report high levels of sexual harassment. EEOC charge 
data, again, revealed that the largest number of claims were filed in the 
accommodation and food services industry followed by retail trade. Both 
industries are dominated by women and pay low-wages at high turno-
ver rates.66 Domestic (household) workers have long been subjected to 
harassment and abuse in isolated and unregulated workplaces, many 
instances even rising to the level of human trafficking and servitude.67 
The infrastructure of the work environment has also been found to 
impact the prevalence of sexual harassment. For example, an Institute 
for Women’s Policy Research study identified several work-related fea-
tures associated with increased risk of sexual harassment and assault 
 
across Industries Affects All Workers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.americ 
anprogress.org/issues/women/news/2017/11/20/443139/not-just-rich-famous/ [https://perma.cc/WF 
4U-H6AY]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Elyse Shaw, Ariane Hegewisch & Cynthia Hess, Sexual Harassment & Assault at Work: 
Understanding the Costs, B376 IWPR 1–12 (Oct. 2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
10/IWPR-sexual-harassment-brief_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/X58H-9CWT]. 
 63 See Parker, supra note 59. 
 64 Women’s Initiative, Women Disproportionately Report Sexual Harassment in Male-Domi-
nated Industries, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/women/news/2018/08/06/454376/gender-matters/ [https://perma.cc/JR4J-AQD2]. 
 65 Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, Sexual Harassment, Work-
place Authority, and the Paradox of Power, 77(4) AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 625, 634 (2012), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003122412451728 [https://perma.cc/MWE7-WCCN]. 
 66 See Frye, supra note 60. 
 67 See Shaw et al., supra note 62, at 3. 
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in the workplace, including: compensation mechanisms that relied on 
tips; work environments in which workers labored in isolation; employ-
ment of workers with irregular immigration status (or where their sta-
tus was dependent on their jobs); and work settings with employees 
with significant power differentials.68 
Other elements of the workplace—e.g., lines of management, su-
pervisory discretion, mechanisms for employee well-being and reten-
tion—can all impact the prevalence of sexual harassment.69 A commit-
tee of experts analyzing the agricultural industry in an International 
Labor Organization (ILO) report, for example, found that the preva-
lence of sexual harassment was impacted by unequal power relations, 
discriminatory work practices, the precariousness of the workers’ em-
ployment, frustration of the right to association and collective bargain-
ing,70 poor working conditions, work intensity or unrealistic production 
goals, the prevalence of informal work,71 and weak enforcement mech-
anisms.72 
Many of these factors, if not all, are features of a workplace within 
the employer’s design and control. Who employers hire, how they treat 
their employees, how they expose them to customers, what forms of 
safety mechanisms are in place, and employee job security all appear to 
have some impact on the prevalence of sexual harassment in the work-
place and are all decisions employers make in designing and maintain-
ing a workplace. While an employer may not have absolute control over 
 
 68 Id. at 4. The last example has been highly publicized in this past year through articles by 
women harassed in the entertainment industry, as well as law clerks and in academia, and, in 
general all professions that instill certain individuals with high levels of unchecked authority. See, 
e.g., Nancy Gertner, Sexual Harassment and the Bench, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2018) https: 
//review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Gertner-1. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/TY5Z-YKAS]; see also Katie Benner, Women in Start-Up World Speak Up Ab- 
out Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/04/insider/technolo 
gy-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/K7AQ-BSQK]; Pamela Hutchinson, #MeToo and 
Hollywood: What’s Changed in the Industry a Year On? THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2018, https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/08/metoo-one-year-on-hollywood-reaction [https://perma.cc/A5YY 
-AAQT]. 
 69 Int’l Labor Org, Conditions of Work and Equality Dept. [ILO], Final Report, at ¶ 62, 105, 
110, Meeting of Experts on Violence against Women and Men in the World of Work, MEVWM/201 
6/7 (Geneva, 3–6 October 2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/do 
cuments/meetingdocument/wcms_546303.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QGE-BYVH]. 
 70 Id. at ¶ 12, 13, 101; see also Int’l Labour Office, Ending Violence and Harassment Against 
Women and Men in the World of Work, ILC.107/V/1 29, 70 (2018), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/gro 
ups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_553577.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B38L-VA6J]. 
 71 Id. at ¶ 12, 101. 
 72 Id. 
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whether harassment occurs, the employer is clearly in a position to sig-
nificantly reduce the opportunity, motivation, and reward systems that 
enable and promote it.73   
Finally, the negative impact of harassment, both on the intended 
victims and the workplace more generally, is clear. Studies have iden-
tified a variety of negative consequences on the health and well-being 
of workers, including increased stress for victims (which can lead to a 
variety of physical ailments), inability of victims to focus on doing their 
tasks correctly and safely, inability of co-workers and managers to ef-
fectively respond to or deal with sexual harassment, intimidation that 
causes victims to be reluctant to raise legitimate safety issues for fear 
of being ridiculed, and workplace violence.74 
B. Redefining Sexual Harassment 
When placed in the context of this research, our legal definition of 
and policy approach to harassment appears badly in need of updating. 
While research has made it evident that harassment is an institutional 
and societal problem, Title VII’s implementation continues to focus on 
isolated inter-personal issues among individuals, such as badly worded 
jokes and inappropriate sexual pursuits of aberrant actors.75 For more 
than a decade now, scholars and advocates have urged lawmakers, 
courts, and employers, with little success, to treat sexual harassment 
claims as part of a larger pattern of workplace discrimination and ine-
quality, consistent with the spirit of Title VII.76 Our current approach 
has not only failed to capture the nature and full range of behavior that 
causes inequality of women in the workplace, but it has undermined 
Title VII’s ability to eradicate gendered employment discrimination, at 
the significant cost of many women and men. 
Vicki Schultz and others77 have proposed the adoption of an ap-
proach to harassment that more comprehensively captures the nature 
of the problematic behavior. Schultz has argued that the sexual com-
ments and behavior courts focus on ignores many of the sex-based 
words and actions in the workplace that are aimed at and succeed in 
 
 73 Ann C. Hodges, Strategies for Combating Sexual Harassment: The Role of Labor Unions, 15 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 183 (2006). 
 74 See, e.g., ILO, Final Report, supra note 69, at ¶ 49; Shaw et al., supra note 62, at 4–6; see 
also Chelsea R. Willness, Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Con-
sequences of Workplace Sexual Harassment, 60 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 127 (2007); Morton Niel-
son, et al., Prospective Relationships between Workplace Sexual Harassment and Psychological 
Distress, 62(3) OCCUP. MED. (LOND) 226 (Mar. 2012). 
 75 Lawton, supra note 1. 
 76 Id. at 820–21. 
 77 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 17. 
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undermining women and limiting their achievements.78 As Schultz has 
explained, even traditional forms of sexual harassment are not, as was 
previously understood, power used to gain access to sex but sexualized 
behavior used to maintain or attain power.79 This understanding builds 
off of Catharine McKinnon’s original framing of sexual harassment as 
domination of one sex over another.80 
Under this framework, sexual harassment is a tool of male workers 
to maintain their status in the workplace and limit economic advance-
ment and opportunities for women (and men who do not meet accepted 
standards of masculinity).81 When understood as a systematic form of 
workplace advantage-seeking behavior, an institutional response by the 
employer seems called for. As discussed in Section II(A), studies show 
that such interventions are impactful.82 Moreover, if this behavior is 
aimed at and succeeds in preserving the very gender inequality our pol-
icies seek to eradicate, interventions that go beyond merely adjudicat-
ing employee complaints through litigation also seem advisable. Our 
failure to do any of this begs the question of whether we seek to eradi-
cate sexual harassment or merely regulate it to a socially acceptable 
degree. And, if the latter, isn’t the tolerance for sexual harassment a 
symptom of the very sexism Title VII was intended to address?83 Are we 
resigned to the contention that sex-based harassment and abuse are 
simply a part of women’s working life even if such behavior leads to 
perpetuating the exclusion of women from the workplace and creating 
barriers to their economic equality? 
III. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 
The ILO standard setting process, “Ending Violence and Harass-
ment Against Women and Men in the World of Work,” began at its 325th 
Session in November of 2015 and provides some insight into alternative 
 
 78 Id. at 26. 
 79 Id. at 27. 
 80 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 27–28 & n. 13 
(1979). 
 81 McLaughlin et al., supra note 65 (explaining that sexual harassment is used to counterbal-
ance women in positions of power and might be motivated more by desire for control and domina-
tion than sexual desire). 
 82 Ryan K. Jacobson and Asia A. Eaton, How Organizational Policies Influenced Bystander 
Likelihood of Reporting Moderate and Severe Harassment at Work, 30:1 EMPLOY. RESPONSE 
RIGHTS J. 37 (2018) (Participants in zero-tolerance policy condition were more likely to intend to 
formally report the harassment to their organization). 
 83 Brenda L. Russell and Kristin Y. Trigg, Tolerance of Sexual Harassment: An Examination 
of Gender Differences, Ambivalent Sexism, Social Dominance, and Gender Roles, 50(7–8) SEX 
ROLES 565 (2004) (explaining that ambivalence and hostility toward women are much greater 
predictors of tolerance of sexual harassment than is gender alone). 
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ways to address sexual harassment in the workplace.84 The ILO initi-
ated this process with the goal of achieving a consensus among its 187 
member states on the nature of violence and harassment in the work-
place and developing a framework for prevention and response.85 
Through this process, the ILO has consolidated national laws and ex-
plored the policy approaches to sexual harassment that have emerged 
through international agreements and within member states. 
As captured in the ILO’s report, the international human rights 
legal system, as well as some of our peer countries, address sexual har-
assment within the larger context of workplace rights and standard vi-
olations. Sexual harassment is treated as a form of violence and abuse 
that burdens the workplace.86 It is considered to be rooted in gender 
discrimination that results in violations of human dignity and equality, 
two historically core principles of the international human rights legal 
system.87 Human dignity is the fundamental principle that an individ-
ual should be treated as an end rather than a means and is considered 
the basis for all human rights.88 The concept of equality requires some 
equal distribution of rights, benefits and opportunities, and ensures 
that any distinctions made among groups that create any disparate en-
joyment of the above is justified. Without a foundation, equality alone 
does not determine what rights, benefits, and privileges must be redis-
tributed.89 Human dignity provides that guide and allows an assess-
ment of whether group distinctions are justified, serving as the basis 
upon which they can be judged as permissible or impermissible.90 
 
 84 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment Against Women and Men in the World of Work, Re-
port [henceforth Ending Violence and Harassment] V(1), ILC. 107/V/1, 1–31, 45–59, 77–83 (May 
12, 2017), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdoc-
ument/wcms_553577.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW68-KCRF]. 
 85 Id. at 33–44, 63–75. 
 86 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at 6, 9, 14–16, 34, 41, 76, 97. 
 87 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the foundation of the human rights 
system, begins with an assertion of the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Pmbl., Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 
one of the system’s first and still most widely recognized treaties, asserts that basic human rights 
“derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” and that the animating principle of the 
covenant is the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family [as] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” G.A. 
Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 88 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights. 
19(4) EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 689–92 (2008). 
 89 Susie Cowen, Can Dignity Guide South Africa’s Equality Jurisprudence, 17 S. AFR. J. ON 
HUM. RTS. 34, 48 (2001). 
 90 McCrudden, supra note 88; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
4/84 of 19 Jan. 1986 (Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of 
Costa Rica requested by the Government of Costa Rica), at ¶¶ 55–56 (“notion of equality springs 
directly from the oneness of the human family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individ-
ual.”). 
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Various international human rights treaties explicitly protect the 
right to dignity and equality in the workplace. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes that “everyone who works has 
the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and 
his family an existence worthy of human dignity.”91 ILO conventions 
have been interpreted to prohibit sexual harassment as a form of phys-
iological coercion, sex discrimination, and violation of workplace health 
and safety, among other grounds.92 Under the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), sexual harassment is not only a direct violation of dignity, 
but a form of inequality that interferes with women’s ability to enjoy 
other basic human rights, such as the right to work, safety, and health 
in the workplace, and equal conditions of employment.93 Under other 
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), sexual harassment interferes with women’s 
right to just and favorable conditions of work on par with men.94 Sexual 
harassment in the workplace is understood to undermine basic tenets 
of human dignity—self-respect, self-worth, physical and psychological 
integrity, and autonomy.95 
Against this background, a state duty to exercise due diligence in 
preventing and protecting individuals from sexual harassment viola-
tions in the workplace has emerged.96 State parties to the relevant trea-
 
 91 G.A. Res. 217 (III), supra note 87, art. 23. 
 92 ILO, ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-Binding Principles and Guid- 
elines for a Rights-Based Approach to Labour Migration, at 9 (2006). 
 93 Though the text of CEDAW is silent on sexual harassment, in 1992, the CEDAW Committee 
issued a comment on gender-based violence, explaining that the state duty to eradicate all forms 
of gender-based violence, including sexual harassment and domestic violence, was implied under 
the treaty obligations to eliminate all forms of gender discrimination. UN Comm. on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on its Eleventh Session, G. Rec. No. 19 (1992). 
 94 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A supra note 87, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966) at 2–3, ¶ 7, (“rights of every-
one to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work” with regard to fair wages and 
“equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women 
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal 
work”). 
 95 McCrudden, supra note 88, at 689–92; The importance of providing economic justice was 
understood as a crucial part of this international movement to secure peace and stability. Article 
23 of the League of Nations Covenant included the “fair and humane conditions of labour for men, 
women, and children” and envisioned the establishment of international organizations to realize 
this objective. This goal was the focus of the International Labour Organization (ILO) established 
in 1919 in Paris to promote fair and humane conditions for workers through legal mechanisms and 
monitoring procedures. 
 96 CEDAW, supra note 93; Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States, Merits Report, 
Inter-Am. Commission on H.R., No.80/11 (July 21, 2011) (explaining that states must exercise due 
diligence to protect women from all forms of gender-based violence). 
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ties are required to put in place legal and policy mechanisms that pre-
vent harassment rather than merely responding to it once it has oc-
curred.97 One such mechanism has been imposition of a duty of care on 
employers that requires them to address, investigate, and respond to 
harassment as a workplace well-being matter.98 This duty requires not 
only an effective and responsive complaint mechanism, but also a 
searching assessment of workplace conditions that cause and enable 
harassment.99 An employer must ensure, as far as is practicable, the 
health and safety of its employees, including protection from harass-
ment. Employers must address badly structured workplace mecha-
nisms that facilitate or enable bullying and abusing of women. Accord-
ing to the ILO, which reviewed the sexual harassment laws and policies 
of 80 countries, 18 countries in Europe and Central Asia, seven coun-
tries in Asia and the Pacific, six countries in the Americas, and one 
country in Africa (none in the Arab States) required employers to take 
some preventative steps to eliminate harassment.100 
The European Union has issued directives on sexual harassment 
that frame it as a discriminatory violation of dignity and requires state 
 
 97 For instance, Article 26(1) and (2) of the Council of Europe European Social Charter (Re-
vised) of 1996 requires states to adopt rules on violence and harassment, which include requiring 
state parties to work with employers and workers to promote awareness, provide information and 
prevent both sexual and moral harassment in the workplace (although a third of the states who 
have ratified do not consider one or both of these paragraphs of the Charter to be binding); the 
2011 Council of Europe Convention (Istanbul Convention) obligates ratifying members to “pro-
hibit, prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women, including sexual harassment, and 
all forms of domestic violence, including economic violence,” ILO, Ending Violence and Harass-
ment, supra note 84, at 41, § 3.5, ¶ 174 and ¶ 175. 
 98 Id. at 56, ¶ 221, p. 65, § 5.3, ¶ 249 and ¶ 251. See also McAleenon v. Autism Initiatives NI 
[2013] NIIT 815/12 [¶ 65] (N. Ir.) (explaining the “danger of an employer not being proactive in 
circumstances where members of staff are known to engage in physical contact”); Grobler v. 
Naspers 2004(4) SA 220(C) (South Africa Labor Court) (finding the employer liable where harass-
ment was a foreseeable risk); Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., 
Jan. 30, 2019, Bull. Civ. V, No. 17-28905 (Fr.) (finding obligation of the employer to take effective 
measures to protect their employees when it is in a situation to exert de facto authority on non-
salaried persons who are responsible for the sexist harassing behavior.) 
 99 EEOC, Enforcement Guide on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by 
Supervisors, (April 6, 2010), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XJ4N-6HDC]. See also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Ellerth and Faragher do not, as the defendants seem to assume, focus mechanically on the formal 
existence of a sexual harassment policy, allowing an absolute defense to a hostile work environ-
ment claim whenever the employer can point to an anti-harassment policy of some sort;” defendant 
failed to prove affirmative defense where it issued written policies without enforcing them, painted 
over offensive graffiti every few months only to see it go up again in minutes, and failed to inves-
tigate sexual harassment as it investigated and punished other forms of misconduct.); see also 
Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 422 (11th Cir. 1999) (employer can 
be held liable despite its immediate and appropriate corrective action in response to harassment 
complaint if it had knowledge of the harassment prior to the complaint and took no corrective 
action). 
 100 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at 63–64, § 35.1, ¶¶ 244–47. 
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members and employers to enact policies aimed at prevention.101 In the 
United Kingdom, for example, sexual harassment is considered a 
“health and safety problem” that an employer has a duty to address, 
ensuring, as far as is practicable, that employees are protected from 
it.102 Employers must conduct risk assessments to identify groups and 
individuals who may be vulnerable to sexual harassment and take ac-
tion.103 Fulfilment of the duty can include, among other things, encour-
aging access to counseling services for sexual harassment victims, for 
example. Employers generally have a full legal defense if they can 
demonstrate they have taken all practicable steps to prevent sexual 
harassment by active workplace policies and awareness strategies.104 
Other countries have focused more broadly on systemic work envi-
ronment management which includes taking measures that reduce op-
portunities for sexual harassment and other forms of “bullying.” The 
Swedish Work Environment Authority (SWEA) conducts inspections 
that are aimed at “strengthening the workplace’s own ability to prevent 
risks.”105 The investigations conducted are corrective and restorative in 
nature. Investigators are instructed to “carr[y] out [inspections] with a 
preventative purpose in mind” and that they “[s]hould not dwell on the 
 
 101 EP Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM), Article 31 of EU Resolu-
tion on Measures to Prevent and Combat Mobbing and Sexual Harassment at Workplace, in Public 
Spaces, and Political Life in the EU (2018) calls on Member States and social partners to ensure 
that employers organize “mandatory training on sexual harassment and bullying”; Article 33 
“stresses that companies should have a zero tolerance approach to sexual harassment. Resolution 
on Measures to Prevent and Combat Mobbing and Sexual Harassment at Workplace, in Public 
Spaces, and Political Life in the EU, Eur. Parl. Doc. P8_TA-PROV(2018)0331; see also Article 26 
of the European Directive on Sexual Harassment “Prevention of discrimination[:] Member States 
shall encourage, in accordance with national law, collective agreements or practice, employers and 
those responsible for access to vocational training to take effective measures to prevent all forms 
of discrimination on grounds of sex, in particular harassment and sexual harassment in the work-
place. Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women 
in Matters of Employment and Occupation (recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 3, https://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0054&from=EN [https://perma.cc/5S26-
2Q5S]; Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European Transformation of Harassment 
Law: Discrimination versus Dignity, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241 (2002). 
 102 Part I, Section 2 of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 “It shall be the duty of every 
employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health safety and welfare at work of 
his employees,” Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, 1, § 2, (Eng.). 
 103 The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 were introduced to rein-
force the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Regulation 3 states that employers “shall make a 
suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which 
they are exposed whilst they are at work,” The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regu-
lations 1999, SI 1999/3242, art. 3, ¶ 1 (Eng.). 
 104 Id. at sec. 7, ¶ 1–5., generally a defense to an alleged breach of sexual discrimination legis-
lation by employers. 
 105 Swedish Work Env’t Auth., Inspections, Investigations and Checks, https://www.av.se/en/ 
work-environment-work-and-inspections/inspections-investigations-and-checks/inspection/ [http 
s://perma.cc/PB9J-T4TH]. 
104 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
question of blame.”106 In determining whether harassment may be al-
tering work conditions impermissibly or creating a hostile work envi-
ronment, the SWEA follows an ordinance on violence and menaces in 
the working environment that identifies several signs of victimization, 
bullying, and harassment among individuals and groups.107 Signs of vic-
timization in an individual employee can include, reduced performance, 
high stress, physical illness, and suicidal thoughts.108 Victimization 
among a group of workers can include reduced efficiency and productiv-
ity, erosion of existing rules or freezing of rules, criticism of the em-
ployer, increased friction, and high sickness absenteeism.109 
In Finland, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSH) sends out a survey to all employees before periodic inspections 
which include questions on harassment and workplace bullying and 
then target those issues.110 The OSH Administration defines harass-
ment as a psychosocial workload factor—“properties related to work 
content, work organization and social interaction in the work commu-
nity” that can cause “harmful work-related strain.” These factors cause 
harmful work-related strain if they are not appropriately managed or if 
workplace conditions are poor.111 In reference to violence and harass-
ment, the Finnish Occupational Safety and Health Act No. 738/2002 
includes specific sections both on the threat of violence and on harass-
ment, requiring employers to prevent any harassment or inappropriate 
behavior towards employees.112 In courts, the same conduct can be rec-
ognized as a work-safety offense and work discrimination.113 
Canadian provinces have incorporated violence and sexual harass-
ment in their occupational health and safety laws as well.114 In Ontario, 
 
 106 Id. 
 107 Ordinance on Violence and Menaces in the Working Environment (Swedish Work Environ-
ment Authority’s Statute Book [AFS] 1993:17) (Swed.). 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Psychosocial Workload, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Finland, 2 (2017) 
TYOSUOUJELU.FI WEBSITE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN FINLA- 
ND, https://www.tyosuojelu.fi/web/en/about-us/publications [https://perma.cc/J2WT-4YXR]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Malgorzata Milczarek, Workplace Violence and Harassment: A European Picture, Eur. Age- 
ncy for Health and Safety at Work, EU-OSHA, 29 (2010), https://osha.europa.eu/en/tools-and-pub-
lications/publications/reports/violence-harassment-TERO09010ENC [https://perma.cc/TK3U-9LE 
7]. 
 113 Riitta Sedig, Hidden Issue Brought to Daylight, Labor & Employment Law Strategic Global 
Topics: Sexual Harassment Law in the Workplace Around the World, 1 (2018). 
 114 For example, New Brunswick has amended the General Regulation—Occupational Health 
and Safety Act NB Reg 91-191 [General Regulation] Amendment, (2019) (“OHSA”) in order to pro-
tect employees from violence and harassment (other jurisdictions in Canada have already enacted 
this kind of legislation). 
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for example, the Workplace Violence & Harassment under the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act115 gives inspectors from Ministry of Labour 
broad powers to investigate complaints, enter workplaces without no-
tice or warrants, make orders requiring the employer to make changes 
to the workplace, and compel them to investigate workplace harass-
ment.116 According to the Ministry of Labor, “[w]orkplace harassment 
includes, but is not limited to: offensive comments or jokes; bullying or 
aggressive behavior; inappropriate staring; sexual harassment; isolat-
ing or making fun of a worker because of their gender identity.”117 These 
are just a few examples of the sorts of mechanisms that attempt to ad-
dress harassment in a more systemic manner with emphasis on preven-
tion. 
IV. DIGNITY AND EQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT 
Some U.S. scholars have viewed the dignity-based approach that 
places sexual harassment in the context of other workplace abuses with 
skepticism. In particular, scholars engaged with women’s equality have 
been concerned that it lacks a focus on the gendered elements of sexual 
harassment to its detriment.118 U.S. scholars argue that sexual harass-
ment benefits from its special status, and that a generalized legal obli-
gation aimed at reducing workplace abuse would redirect resources for 
sex-based sexual harassment as well as undermine the gravity with 
which the law approaches it.119 
Similarly, U.S. scholars have viewed the focus on dignity, particu-
larly in Europe, as a preoccupation with civility, inappropriate for the 
American social context and meriting a far lower place on the scale of 
legal importance than status discrimination.120 America’s history of rac-
ism, the mobility of its workforce, and cultural ethos of unregulated 
 
 115 Ontario Women’s Justice Network, Workplace Violence and Harassment – Occupational He- 
alth and Safety Act, OWJN, (August 1, 2016), owjn.org/2016/08/workplace-violence-and-harass-
ment-occupational-health-and-safety-act/ [https://perma.cc/3474-7553]. 
 116 HR Proactive Inc., An Employer’s Guide to Conducting Harassment Investigations, https://h 
ttps://harassmentinvestigation.ca/employer_guide_harass_invest.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9KS-G2C 
N]; Crisis Prevention Institute, Nonviolent Crisis Prevention, CPI, http://educate.crisispreven-
tion.com/OntarioBill168NowKnownAsSection32OntarioOHSA.html?code=ITG081PSRW&src=Pa 
y-Per-Click [https://perma.cc/6EHC-GCRL]. 
 117 Being Harassed at Work? Information for Workers, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF LABOR (May 2017) 
, https://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/hs/pubs/fs_wvh_atwork.php [https://perma.cc/645H-8 
NCH]. 
 118 Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality—Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 
86 IND. L. J. 1219 (Fall 2011); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Friedman and Whitman, supra note 101, at 273. 
 119 Abrams, supra note 118, at 1249. 
 120 Friedman and Whitman, supra note 101, at 264–65. 
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speech are thought to make the focus on workplace dignity and regula-
tion of workplace behavior ill-suited to the U.S. context. 121 
These objections raise a number of questions. The first is whether 
women have really experienced gains through the separation of sexual 
harassment from general workplace protections.122 Second is whether 
our aversion to dignity-focused protections has deprived us of meaning-
fully assessing what we have, implicitly, already recognized as viola-
tions of dignity—behavior that offends, humiliates and abuses. The 
third is whether the competing values we seek to protect (speech and 
authenticity in the workplace, prioritization of status discrimination, 
and dogged deterrence through liability) are being served or would be 
at risk were reforms to involve increased workplace interventions. 
Alternatively, embracing a dignity-based approach could provide 
us with a positive vision of the workplace, which we currently lack. 
Without a positive vision for the workplace, it is difficult for us to deter-
mine what it should look like for women, and consequently it is difficult 
to discern our policy goals for gender equality in the workplace. Juris-
dictions that address harmful workplace dynamics and dignitary issues 
necessarily proceed with an understanding of how employees should re-
late to one another in the workplace and what workers may expect in 
terms of standards and norms in their place of employment.123 Our re-
luctance to recognize social patterns of harassment and aversion to reg-
ulating private conduct has caused us to struggle to develop a concep-
tion of a sexual harassment free work environment. 
Moreover, we have missed out on the practical and policy-oriented 
advantages of an approach that prioritizes prevention of workplace 
practices that promote or facilitate harassing behavior. Systems that 
focus on prevention avoid complaint dependence, an approach that bur-
dens women and produces irregular and ineffective deterrence.124 A fo-
cus on prevention, along with involvement of both the state and em-
ployer, would better position us to make systemic change and 
ultimately alter the incentive system that rewards harassment with 
gains in benefits and power.125 Conceiving of harassment as a workplace 
wellbeing issue would also more effectively compel employer responsi-
bility for crafting responsive workplaces,126 as harassment would not be 
 
 121 Friedman & Whitman, supra note 101, at 269–71. 
 122 At various points, scholars and commentators have seen the advantages of an approach 
that conceives of harassment as a dignitary workplace safety and wellbeing issue. Anita Bernstein 
and Catherine McKinnon have both noted the regulatory and preventative advantages. See 
MACKINNON, supra note 80, at 159; Bernstein, supra note 5 at 1256–1311. 
 123 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at ¶ 12, 13, 29, 70, 101. 
 124 See, e.g., SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 40, at 177. 
 125 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 17, at 30, 59–66. 
 126 ILO, Ending Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at ¶ 25 and 44. 
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conceived as an inevitable feature of work itself (which studies suggest 
it is not), but an element specific to particular workplaces that facilitate 
or promote it.127 Conceiving of sexual harassment as an occupational 
health and safety issue, for example, has allowed other jurisdictions to 
focus on the psychological well-being and safety of employees in an af-
firmative sense. Contrast this with our approach that asks just how 
abusive the harassment must be before we allow legal action against 
the harasser. 
Finally, and perhaps key, this approach allows us to better under-
stand how harassment works and how to address it. Sexual harassment 
as a manifestation of gender discrimination is both unique (in the sense 
that it is rooted in and seeks to preserve gender inequality) and not 
unique in the sense that workplace harassment can also be rooted in 
and seek to preserve other forms of inequality (based in race, caste, dis-
abilities, economic status, ideology).128 By placing sexual harassment in 
context to focus more on the bullying and abuse and less on sex, we can 
begin to understand harassment as a tool for workplace (and economic) 
benefits and craft a better strategy to eradicate it. 
Pursuing an approach that considers dignity and equality, as inter-
twined, does not mean we must abandon prioritizing gender discrimi-
nation. A focus on dignity does not mean a failure to focus on equality; 
dignity provides content to anchor the goals of equality. We can draw 
from the concept of substantive equality under CEDAW which under-
stands gender discrimination as a barrier that impedes women’s enjoy-
ment of their fundamental rights.129 Here, dignity has long been the 
complementary foundation for equality, as women’s inequality is under-
stood as policies and practices that deprive women of their human dig-
nity and other basic rights.130 Jurisdictions, like South Africa, that have 
prioritized addressing matters of non-discrimination have long ap-
proached equality determinations with an implicit foundation of human 
 
 127 Arianna Rossi, Ending Violence at the Workplace, WORLD OF WORK MAGAZINE OF ILO 
(2017) at 37–40. 
 128 Workers in poor working conditions, atypical employment (particularly temporary jobs), 
women entering industries traditionally dominated by men, and self-employed or low-hours work-
ers who are outside the scope of labor law are particularly vulnerable to violence. ILO, Ending 
Violence and Harassment, supra note 84, at ¶ 108. See also Article 35 of EU Measures to Prevent 
and Combat Mobbing and Sexual Harassment at Workplace, in Public Spaces, and Political Life 
in the EU which “calls on Member States to take measures to ensure equal pay between women 
and men . . . as a means of promoting gender equality and respect for human dignity, which is 
fundamental to combating VAW. EU Measures, supra note 101. 
 129 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180, Art. 11, ¶ 18; G.A. Res. 1325, Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1979); UN Comm. on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women on its Thirtieth Session, G. Rec. No. 25 (2004). 
 130 Id. 
108 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
dignity.131 An approach rooted in human dignity would both preserve 
our focus on eradicating status discrimination while also providing a 
touchpoint for workplace rights and standards that comport with our 
sense of what human dignity requires. 
The balance between general workplace rights and a focus on sta-
tus discrimination has been described as a targeted universalist ap-
proach—an approach which identifies a basic standard and analyzes 
how groups are being deprived of that standard.132 As an example, a 
goal set for a population could be access to health care and groups would 
be evaluated for their access to that goal.133 While this may move us in 
the right direction, the additional challenge in this context is that we 
lack an actual standard. Including more groups into those with access 
to rights, benefits, or resources is necessary, but not sufficient to ad-
dress harassment in our workplaces.134 We need first a concept, and I 
have suggested human dignity, around which to orient workplace 
norms and standards. 
The better conceptual model for addressing sexual harassment in 
the U.S. is that of transformation, which goes beyond ensuring that 
more groups are brought into the fold of existing circumstances and 
benefits. As Catherine Albertyn has explained, in reference to the juris-
prudence of the South African Constitutional Court, inclusivity often 
struggles with fundamental transformation—inclusive approaches re-
sist altering basic structures, seeking instead to preserve the status quo 
but with a broader base of beneficiaries. An inclusive approach may fo-
cus on hiring more women in a particular workplace, whereas a trans-
formative approach may ask what policies and practices were excluding 
them in the first place (e.g., lack of maternity leave or comprehensive 
health insurance), whether skills and talents valued rely on gender ste-
reotypes (e.g., approaches to marketing or making sales that reward 
stereotypical gendered behavior), or whether the women who are hired 
are being hampered in some way that is encouraging turn over or lim-
iting their advancement. A transformative approach would then ask 
whether these conditions are necessary features of the work being per-
formed and how they can be altered so as to create a workplace that 
equally incorporates and supports women. A transformative approach 
to equality demands an analysis of fundamental social and institutional 
structures, what they prioritize, who they exclude, and the values they 
 
 131 For an example of how dignity and equality interact in other jurisdictions, see Cowen, supra 
note 89, at 34–58. 
 132 John A. Powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 802–03 
(2008). 
 133 Id. 
 134 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 118, at 1281–84. 
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are based on. This approach identifies the why and how with the goal 
of reconceiving the system so as to alter its present dynamics.135 
The creation of a standard that provides content to human dignity 
in the workplace along with a re-evaluation of existing inequalities 
would provide a more robust strategy for addressing sexual harass-
ment. It would require development of a policy goal—a model of the 
workplace as a healthy, productive, and safe environment that nurtures 
all worker capacity and discourages and addresses abuses, humilia-
tions, and avoidable burdens. 
Such a conception or model for the workplace would give us a better 
sense of the goals in eradicating harassment as well as a yardstick by 
which to measure the progress towards ensuring all enjoy and have full 
access to the workplace and the economic benefits it provides. An ap-
proach based in equality and dignity with a positive vision of the work-
place would also be responsive to our major jurisprudential challenge—
the difficulty courts have had in extracting a norm against which sexual 
harassment is measured due to significant elements of sexism and mi-
sogyny that dominate our culture. Without a marker of what is and is 
not permissible in the workplace, courts cast about for intuition of what 
is a bridge too far when it comes to humiliation and objectification of 
women. 
Ultimately, a standard for the workplace would elevate judicial in-
quiries (and that of juries under judicial guidance) from a realm of ar-
bitrating disputes in personal relationships to one with institutional 
import. This kind of standard would also engage employers in the work 
of prevention. To build a better workplace for women, we need to simply 
build a better workplace—one that, at the outset, understands the so-
cial inequality it seeks to correct. 
V. A POSITIVE VISION OF THE WORKPLACE 
The task is now to cultivate a positive vision of the workplace in 
which to root a legal and policy framework that addresses workplace 
sexual harassment. To transform the American workplace, a positive 
vision must express value for the worker generally and for the female 
worker specifically, addressing both notions of human dignity and 
equality. With a positive vision of the workplace, our society can define 
the workplace more clearly, including what conditions of employment 
workers can expect and the role of the employer in providing them. With 
this vision, we can better gauge when humiliations, abuses, and other 
tactics are employed by individuals in the workplace to discriminate 
 
 135 Albertyn, supra note 55. 
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against women and gain advantage from gender inequality. We can es-
tablish what constitutes discrimination, not by measuring behavior 
against social norms that may be discriminatory themselves, but by 
measuring against standards of human dignity and equality. Our as-
sessment of sexual harassment can be grounded in an understanding of 
its role in exploiting and reinforcing “socially constructed power imbal-
ances”136 to the benefit of harassers, the ill Title VII sought to remedy. 
We are not entirely without a positive vision of the American work-
place. For example, some American companies have stepped forward to 
craft better workplaces for their female employees.137 Though now out-
dated and significantly weakened, we once enacted a legislative 
scheme, the Fair Labor Standards Act, aimed at protecting the Ameri-
can workforce and respecting the dignity of the worker that set basic 
wages and some conditions for employment.138 We have recognized the 
importance of sexual harassment prohibitions in implementing “the 
goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment”139 but 
we lack a contemporary vision in which to ground a renewed effort to 
transform the workplace.140 
 
 136 Eric Stener Carlson, The ILO’s Innovative Approach to Ending Gender-Based Violence and 
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85] BEYOND THE BAD APPLE 111 
For numerous reasons commented on by many—the U.S. individu-
alistic culture, the mobility of our population and workforce, commit-
ment to free market principles, corporate influence and flexible commu-
nities—we have never fully developed robust labor and employment 
legal protections.141 In comparison to similar economies and societies 
with our institutional capacity, the American worker labors at the will 
and whims of an employer, under terms set almost exclusively by that 
employer with little intervention by the government.142 Thus, our work-
ers rely on a minimum wage that has not been updated in nearly a dec-
ade143 (that many argue has increased poverty levels in the U.S.);144 
overtime pay that excludes a large and vulnerable sector of the labor 
market (including farmworkers and domestic workers, among oth-
ers);145 the absence of pension requirements or other retirement guar-
antees provided as par for the course in many other jurisdictions;146 and 
at-will employment arrangements that create insecurity.147 Similarly, 
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sick pay, unemployment benefits, and annual leave are far less gener-
ous in the U.S. in comparison to our peers. In a recent study of 14 Eu-
ropean countries and the U.S., we fared worse than all comparators.148 
For example, unemployment compensation in our peer countries is of-
ten provided at a rate of 90% of previous earnings for an approximate 
100 weeks. We provide between 40% and 50% of earnings for up to 26 
weeks, depending on the individual state.149 
Even those protections we do grant by virtue of the employer and 
employee relationship do not extend to all American workers. One in 
ten workers in the US labor market is in a “contingent and alternative 
employment arrangement.”150 Nearly 7% of these workers are classified 
as independent contractors.151 These designations, though often ar-
ranged very similarly to an employee and employer relationship, liber-
ate the employer from paying the minimum wage and overtime under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, paying for unemployment and compen-
sation benefits, as well as from providing accommodations under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.152 Employers have become wise to this 
option and have increasingly classified their employees as independent 
contractors, which has led to a rash of litigation.153 
Thus, we have primarily left it to the employer to craft a just and 
functional workplace. Workers are expected to either accept the terms 
set by the employer or leave. Members of our workforce have few legal 
rights and employers have few restrictions or obligations to ensure 
worker well-being. Time and again courts have defended the principle 
of at-will unregulated employment, resisting contractual obligations 
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and, time and again, any effort to demand workplace security or mini-
mal terms has been struck down.154 Even in situations where workers 
are under the control and behest of their employers (such as temporary 
foreign labor programs, where the worker’s presence in this country is 
subject to their employment), courts have rarely and reluctantly found 
any entitlements or obligations.155 
These conditions have meant that particularly vulnerable popula-
tions, such as our low-wage sector, which is populated by many immi-
grants with irregular immigration status,156 has been marred by wage 
violations and abuses.157 The limited capacity of the Department of La-
bor,158 as well as the weakening of our unions, has made the workplace 
a difficult place for low-wage workers.159 Anti-immigrant messaging has 
created even greater room for exploitation of the low-wage sector. Im-
migrant workers labor in industries often excluded from our already 
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 158 During the last three decades, funding levels for agencies that enforce laws against work-
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thin employment protections.160 These industries, unsurprisingly, have 
reported high levels of sexual harassment.161 
The low value we place on the worker is then compounded by our 
even lower estimation of the woman worker, a consequence of which is 
the dearth of women in decision-making positions in most fields.162 On 
all protections and benefits aimed at facilitating women’s participation 
in the workforce, we provide little. The U.S. is one of the few countries 
(and alone among its economic peers) that does not provide paid mater-
nity leave.163 In addition, the lack of any real child care alternatives for 
women, certainly none that are legally mandated, makes child care a 
nearly prohibitive cost for many working women.164 In contrast, flexible 
working practices that benefit employees with childcare responsibilities 
are common in countries like Denmark, Germany, and the Nether-
lands.165 In the Netherlands, the Dutch government has developed 
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37 percent of all physicians and surgeons are women, but only 16 percent of permanent medical 
school deans are women. Judith Warner and Danielle Corley, The Women’s Leadership Gap: 
Women’s Leadership by the Numbers, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (May 21, 2017). 
 163 The United States and Mexico are the only two OECD countries that do not guarantee at 
least 14 weeks of paid leave to mothers of infants, see Amy Raub et al., Paid Parental Leave: A 
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childcare centers that are partly funded by the government and partly 
by employers.166 This, combined with the unwillingness of employers to 
provide access to health insurance plans that cover women’s reproduc-
tive health,167 mean women’s career choices and experiences at work 
are impacted heavily by their reproductive choices.168 
Our employer policies to keep compensation private also make it 
difficult for women to determine whether (or more realistically to what 
extent) they are being compensated at lower rates than their male 
peers. As of 2019, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research reported a 
20 percent gender wage gap between men and women in the U.S., with 
female full-time, year-round workers making 80.5 cents for every dollar 
earned by men.169 The gender wage gap in the U.S. is higher than that 
of France, Ireland, Spain, Mexico, Switzerland, Germany, and the 
UK.170 
Why does this matter? As the research discussed earlier suggests, 
sexual harassment is likely to thrive in environments where workers 
are not valued, where women workers are particularly undervalued, 
and where employers have not provided a functional environment that 
discourages exploitation of existing societal status-based hierarchies 
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and inequalities. As discussed above, job insecurity, excessive discre-
tion, workforce turn-over, ineffective management practices, inade-
quate reporting mechanisms, uneven workload distribution, and the ab-
sence of messaging around employer values and priorities can all enable 
environments in which sexual harassment will thrive. #MeToo reports 
circulated in the media this year were filled with examples of work-
places with no regulation, little worker value, and the absence of work-
ing systems of accountability. Law clerks to the judiciary,171 seasonal 
farmworkers,172 interns for star record producers,173 and graduate stu-
dents174 all emerged as examples of workers left by their institutional 
employers to labor at the mercy of their supervisors in environments 
where the female worker was clearly not the employers’ priority. 
We cannot disassociate the general workplace environment from 
sexual harassment practices, nor should we try. Women work in con-
texts where harassment persists because that is what is available to 
them. Workplaces fail to correct this behavior because they do not have 
to. In this context, it is simply unrealistic to expect that we would target 
sexual harassment in a culture of workplace neglect and unrealistic to 
think courts should reach for larger themes of employee and worker 
protection and rights when few currently exist. The message of the 
workplace is already that workers are not priorities, and women work-
ers even less. To change this approach, we must change how the work-
place values the woman worker and set standards and practices that 
facilitate women’s presence, prioritize their equality and human dig-
nity, and remove any reward systems that encourage sexual harass-
ment and abuse. 
As discussed above, research and comparative country examples 
provide some guidance for how to address dynamics in the workplace 
that are promoting a culture of gender-motivated abuse. A case study 
from within the U.S. also illustrates what a transformation could look 
like, courtesy of the very group of workers provided with the least pro-
tections and often subject to the highest levels of abuse—low-wage im-
migrant farmworkers.175 The Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), 
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recent recipients of the MacArthur Genius grant, in an effort to sidestep 
our broken labor enforcement system, have created a private regulation 
program based on worker dignity and equality that has drastically re-
duced sexual harassment in agriculture.176 Through an innovative or-
ganizing campaign that received much acclaim, CIW managed to com-
pel the U.S. tomato-growing industry (which amounts to 50%–90% of 
U.S. tomato consumption) to agree to transform their workplaces into 
ones grounded in concepts of dignity and equality committed to provid-
ing fair wages and conditions of employment and environments free of 
sexual harassment and abuse.177 
This private regulation system, known as the Fair Food Program 
(FFP), consists of a complex system of education, prevention, enforce-
ment, and accountability that involves the employer, supervisors, and 
workers in a collaborative process to jointly transform their work envi-
ronments.178 The program was formed by leveraging consumer influ-
ence over tomato buyers (fast food restaurants, grocery chains, and res-
taurants suppliers) to compel tomato farms to participate in a joint 
program to regulate and improve worker conditions.179 To date, 90% of 
tomato growers in Florida, approximately 12 growers and over 30,000 
workers, participate in FFP, along with major tomato buyers such as 
McDonalds, Whole Foods, Walmart, Burger King, Subway, and Taco 
Bell.180 The program, which is designed around the concept of human 
dignity in the workplace (both as a right and expectation) has, after six 
years, reported virtual elimination of repeat sexual harassment inci-






 176 Bernice Yeung, What Hollywood Can Learn From Farmworkers, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/09/farmworkers-janitors-sexual-harassment-training.html 
[https://perma.cc/623B-6GWL]; Joann Lo and Ariel Jacobson, Human Rights from Field to Fork: 
Improving Labor Conditions for Food-Sector Workers by Organizing across Boundaries, 5:1 
RACE/ETHNICITY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY GLOBAL CONTEXTS 61 (2011); Greg Asbed and Sean Sellers, 
The Fair Food Program: Comprehensive, verifiable and sustainable change for farmworkers, 16 U. 
PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 39 (2013). 
 177 FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, 2017 Annual Report, http://www.fairfoodprogram.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/06/Fair-Food-Program-2017-Annual-Report-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C68-BT7T]. 
 178 FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, About the Fair Food Program, http://www.fairfoodprogram.org [https: 
//perma.cc/5P2A-H9AE]. 
 179 Michael Sainato, Farmworker Campaign Heads to Wendy’s Headquarters: Will the Fast 
Food Giant Finally Listen?, THE NATION (June 4, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/farm-
worker-campaign-heads-wendys-headquarters-will-fast-food-giant-finally-listen/ [https://perma.c 
c/7BAE-FXXS]. 
 180 Fair Foods Standards Council, Partners, FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, http://www.fairfoodprogram. 
org/partners/ [https://perma.cc/C2JJ-QE5A]. 
 181 FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, 2017 Annual Report, supra note 177. 
118 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
The program consists of four components: a workplace code of con-
duct, worker to worker education, external auditing, and a complaint 
resolution mechanism that prioritizes timely resolution and immediate 
consequences along a graduated system that has, to date with one ex-
ception, avoided recourse to arbitration. The code of conduct is built 
around the concepts of fair and just conditions and worker dignity. It 
was developed by the workforce to address practical challenges of agri-
cultural employment. It sets employment practices along with a tiered 
system of violations and consequences for employees and employers. It 
regulates wages, health and safety (e.g., shaded structures, protective 
gear, rest breaks, availability of medical treatment), conditions of ter-
mination, workplace violence, sexual harassment, and anti-discrimina-
tion.182 
The worker education component involves yearly on-site and inter-
active training sessions (for workers and supervisors), focused on the 
right to be safe, secure, and respected in the workplace; scenarios on 
sexual harassment are debated through group discussions and work-
shop breakouts. It discusses, among other things, power dynamics and 
what abuse of power means, societal discrimination based on gender, 
race, and ethnicity, and sexual harassment in various forms and its con-
sequences for women workers and the workplace more generally.183 
Participating employers agree to pay worker representatives to be 
trained and facilitate sessions. 
The Fair Food Standards Council (FFSC), which consists of 15 em-
ployees under the direction of retired New York State Judge Laura 
Safer Ezpinoza, monitors workplaces through yearly audits (and some-
times unannounced audits). These audits involve interviews with at 
least 50% of workers on each farm with employer cooperation, including 
open access to records. In 2017, the FFSC conducted approximately 200 
field and financial audits.184 
Finally, the program contains an independent complaint mecha-
nism that includes a 24-hour hotline for worker reports, which has ad-
dressed 1800 complaints since 2011, or approximately 400 a year. An 
investigation is conducted and findings are issued, often within weeks. 
There are three levels of violations around workplace violence and 
abuse within the system. Tier 1 is forced labor or the repeated use of 
child labor; Tier 2 is status discrimination, abuse, sexual harassment, 
or the systemic failure to pay wages; and Tier 3 is the failure to afford 
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rest breaks or adequate drinking water. The required employer re-
sponses to abuse and harassment vary depending on its severity. Sex-
ual harassment that involves physical contact, for example, requires 
immediate termination upon issuance of a finding, or the participating 
employer is suspended from the program. Harassment that did not in-
clude physical contact requires specified remedial action to avoid sus-
pension or probation, which can include progressive discipline (a writ-
ten warning and second time termination) and a corrective action plan 
for hostile work environment. Finally, the program contains sanctions 
for non-compliant employers which can include suspension, probation, 
and elimination from the program. 
The FFP aptly illustrates several features fundamental to trans-
formation of any workplace. It is based on a positive vision of the work-
place that is grounded in human dignity—respect, security, and valua-
tion of the worker—and places sexual harassment in this context, while 
still acknowledging its roots in gender inequality. It builds employee 
consciousness through worker to worker trainings and sets clear expec-
tations for workplace behavior in an effort to define workplace culture. 
More broadly, it creates a dialogue in the workplace community about 
sexual harassment and gender discrimination which itself, over time, 
can serve to transform the culture. It supports women workers specifi-
cally by developing women’s leadership through trainings and monitor-
ing, increasing women’s power and leverage in the workplace. It is 
structured so as to create workforce buy-in at all levels with low and 
mid-level supervisor training and peer-to-peer engagements, better en-
suring that messaging and direction is consistent at all levels of man-
agement. Finally, it has robust but graduated consequences that allow 
for correction and adaptation before concerns about liability and dam-
age awards begin to disincentivize the employer from acknowledging 
the existence of harmful workplace dynamics. The goals of the correc-
tive consequences are at once restorative and prompt, allowing the 
workplace to transform while maintaining its integrity. 
These approaches could be applied to workplaces more broadly 
with employer engagement. For example, workers could be invited to 
participate in creating dignity-based workplaces. Women workers could 
be encouraged to take leadership roles in defining what such a work-
place would look like. Corrective mechanisms could be, at least in initial 
stages, aimed at improving workplace dynamics through restorative 
justice and other means rather than focusing on punishment and legal 
consequences. The FFP model, coupled with a legal framework that in-
volves employers in preventing and addressing dynamics that facilitate 
harassment, could be more effective in sustainably combatting work-
place sexual harassment. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 It is a unique moment for the issue of sexual harassment, which 
often struggles to gain the attention of policy makers and the public. 
Following #MeToo reports, stars pledged to add inclusion riders to their 
contracts, corporations declared they would abandon practices of man-
dating arbitration agreements, and coalitions of powerful female influ-
encers called for action. These are all encouraging developments, but, 
beneath these efforts, we are left with a policy approach and legal mech-
anism that do not effectively address the workplace violations they seek 
to target. 
The ILO has tried to provide a framework for conceiving of sexual 
harassment within a larger vision of a just workplace, one rooted in re-
spect for human dignity and correction of inequalities that violate that 
dignity. The framework acknowledges that women are deprived of their 
basic human rights because of the “socially constructed power imbal-
ances”185 which society at large and workplaces, in particular, exploit 
and further entrench. The Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ Fair Food 
Program provides a worker-run private sector model for self-regulation 
in an industry attempting to change workplace culture and values. The 
program targets sexual harassment while addressing workplace dignity 
violations in a holistic manner. 
Both approaches recognize the inefficacy of any attempt to address 
inequality without a foundation of rights and expectations. Our current 
approach to sexual harassment (and gender discrimination more gen-
erally) falls into this very trap. We ask only whether a claimant was 
treated with sex-based hostility against some unidentified social norm 
left to the discretion of a judge or jury. Our legal framework has yet to 
make explicit norms or expectations on the treatment of individuals in 
the workplace, which would allow us to determine whether the treat-
ment in question violated these expectations. We need to understand 
not only that gender discrimination in the workplace is prohibited, but 
what rights, benefits, and privileges the workplace affords that require 
equal distribution and access between the genders. For this, we need a 
positive vision of a just and functional workplace to guide expectations 
and then determine how to ensure it is realized for all workers. 
Various reforms would move us in the right direction. Legislation 
and policy reforms aimed at better protecting worker’s rights (job secu-
rity, benefits, limitations of independent contractor classifications, 
wage violations), the passage of healthy workplace legislation186 estab-
lishing a duty of care for employers (that addresses harassment and 
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other forms of abuse), and extra-discrimination remedies187 (that assist 
in ensuring available benefits are accessible to all) would provide a 
foundation for workplace standards and expectations. Supplementing 
this, reforms that target harassment, such as congressional clarifica-
tion of Title VII’s intent and definition of sexual harassment, promul-
gation of industry-specific recommendations on harassment,188 and in-
corporation of harassment into Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s preventative mandate189 would assist in addressing 
sexual harassment directly. Finally, policies that accommodate women 
in the workplace, such as paid maternity leave and comprehensive 
health insurance, make women more secure and communicate their 
value to the workplace. These policy changes could, in turn, decrease 
opportunities for harassment by lessening women’s vulnerability to 
abuses of power. Reforms such as these would provide our judiciary and 
juries with a standard against which to measure liability for sexual har-
assment cases and employers and employees direction on expectations 
and duties. As the Court recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges,190 the 
recognition of women’s dignity and equality is a process of evolution, as 
“women gained legal, political, and property rights, and as society be-
gan to understand that women have their own equal dignity.”191 To 
move forward towards recognition of women’s equal dignity, we must 
protect and identify workplace rights and benefits as well as ensure 
that women are afforded their equal enjoyment. 
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